Review of “Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind”
Part 5, The Problem Of Induction; Christianity And The Nature Of Religion
by Daniel H Chew
Book: Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (London, UK: Penguin Random House, 2011)
Outline:
Specific critiques: History of primeval human development: preliminary concerns
Specific critiques: The problem of induction; Christianity and the Nature of Religion
The problem of induction
As we prepare to re-analyze the facts behind Harari’s narrative of pre-written history, I hope that it can be seen that, while there are many true facts that are mustered by Harari, there is also much speculation involved. Such speculation are highly problematic because of the problem of induction, where multiple theories could explain the various “facts.” The problem of induction is known for a long time, and so far, nobody it seems has come up with a satisfactory way to resolve it.
Put simply, induction is the logically equivalent of the fallacy of affirming the consequent. The simplest form is expressed in the syllogism as follows:
If p, then q
q
Therefore p
Where p and q are various propositions
If all swans are white, then I will see white swans (True by definition). All the swans that I have seen are white. Therefore, does it mean that all swans are white? No, because there just might be one black swan hiding behind the tree that I have not seen.
We see here a simple example of the problem of induction. The problem is that empirical scientific inquiry as a whole falls prey to the problem of induction, in the following form:
If [X scientific theory is true], then [evidence P]
[Evidence P]
Therefore [X scientific theory is true]
Modern science gets away with committing this logical fallacy by largely ignoring the discussion. After all, doesn’t the successes of science validate the scientific method? But that is to confuse success with truth, and the two are not necessarily the same. Without going into the messy business of the philosophy of science, let it be said that there are many antirealist theories of science that do not require science to be true in order for it to be successful. (12) After all, a theory does not have to be true to be successful as long as it approximates some level of correspondence to the truth, as the success of Newtonian physics has shown.
Newtonian and Einsteinian physics are operational sciences, but what happens when you look at things that happen in history, when by definition history is not scientifically repeatable? The problem of induction is magnified because now there is no way to gauge any correspondence to the truth. As long as theories can accommodate the empirical facts, who is to say why one theory X is preferable to another theory Y? Why is Harari’s narrative of history preferable to any other narrative that can accommodate those same facts as well? The answer is that one cannot say that to be the case. As long as the competing narrative Y can accommodate the same facts, that narrative has just as much right to be considered history as Harari’s “history of humankind.”
Christianity and the nature of religion
The telling of human history can therefore be done from a different perspective. In fact, it can be done from a superior perspective. In the Christian perspective, there is one written evidence of primeval history: the Bible, specifically Genesis 1-11. As we have shown, Harari misinterprets and misunderstands the Bible, and so we would not expect him to understand this. But before engaging history again, it would do well to defang the speculative nonsense of those making religion a purely natural thing.
According to Harari, “legends, myths, gods and religions appeared for the first time with the Cognitive Revolution” (p. 27), and that these things stem from the imagination of human beings (p. 31). But why should humans imagine religions and gods if they knew they do not ontologically exist? And where would those “true believers” (pp. 124-6), who are needed for the success of the myths, come from? Could Harari bring himself to believe what he knew to be a lie? I doubt so.
Harari narrates the supposed evolution of religion in chapter 12 (pp. 233-263). Here, he asserts that religion has to become “universal and missionary” in order to unite humankind, and that universality comes about by syncretism, such that modern monotheism is a “kaleidoscope of monotheist, dualist, polytheist and animist legacies” (p. 248). In like manner, he asserts that “the average Christian believes in the monotheistic God, but also in the dualist Devil, in polytheist saints, and in animist ghosts” (p. 248), which incidentally betrays again his ignorance of Christianity. (13) In response to Harari, it must be asked how his narrative of the supposed evolution of religion can even make sense when he misrepresents at least one religion: Christianity. Also, since all forms of religion continue to exist today, how can it be said that one form of religion is evolutionary superior compared to other forms of religions. Is not the ranking of religions imagined based upon what the historian of religion think is intellectually superior and which is intellectually inferior, without any regard paid whatsoever to the actual religious beliefs and histories of those who actually believe in these religions? In other words, such an evolutionary ranking is a figment of the imagination (no real proof), only existing in the minds of those who are already firmly convinced of the evolution of religion.
The fact is that any supposed evolution of religion is pure speculation. Based on the evolutionary perspective, it seems obvious that humans at point A (big brain ape-like creatures) have no religion, whereas we have religion at point B (humans at the flashpoint of literacy) and most definitely now. The “evolution of religion” assumes the evolutionary narrative and therefore most posit an evolution of religion because they know a priori that religions must have evolved if they are to exist today. But what if we deny there is such a thing as point A? If there is no point A, then the whole premise behind the history and philosophy of religion simply collapses.
The issue boils down to human evolution and the naturalistic premise. Harari simply assumes both to be true, and so does liberal modernity as a whole. But why are these true? As we have seen so far, there are facts, and there is speculation surrounding the facts. Likewise, we have certain human artifacts, some radiometric dates, and others like them, but must they only be interpreted in the liberal modernist sense? If an alternate theory (Y) can assimilate those facts as well, then surely the speculation in theory X is no more or less scientific than that of theory Y.
Christianity has one assertion up its sleeve however: an ace card if you will. If both X and Y are both equally legitimate, then the fact that in theory Y, there is a claim to a written account of primeval history based on eye-witness testimony would surely count in its favor. It is thus preferable to run with the contours of theory Y as compared to that of X, all things being equal.
12. The most famous of the anti-realists is probably Thomas Kuhn, who made the term “paradigm” famous in his discussion of scientific revolutions [c.f. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3rd ed.; Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996)]
13. The Scriptures teaches a monotheistic God, a Devil who is a mere creature rebelling against God, saints who consists of all believers both alive and dead as long as they have true faith in Christ, and only three types of spirits: the Holy Spirit, angelic or demonic spirits, and human spirits.